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ABSTRACT
This paper estimates the effects of temporary driver's license suspensions on driving
behavior. A little known rule in the German traffic penalty catalogue maintains that
drivers who commit a series of speeding transgressions within 365 days should have
their license suspended for one month. My fuzzy regression discontinuity design
exploits the quasi-random assignment of license suspensions caused by the 365-day
cutoff and shows that 1-month license suspensions lower the probability of recidivating
within a year by 20 percent. This effect is not driven by incapacitation and indicates that
temporary license suspensions are an effective tool in preventing traffic transgressions.

Markus Gehrsitz
NBER
5 Hanover Square, Suite 1602
New York, NY 10004
mgehrsitz@gradcenter.cuny.edu

He who undertakes to punish with reason does not avenge himself for the past o↵ense,
since he cannot make what was done as though it had not come to pass; he looks rather to
the future, and aims at preventing that particular person and others who see him punished
from doing wrong again. (Plato, Protagoras p. 324)
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Introduction
Worldwide, more than 1.2 million people die every year in traffic accidents (WHO,

2013). In 2010, traffic injuries in the US claimed the lives of 45,342 Americans and caused
medical and work loss costs of more than $100 billion. Motor vehicle crashes are the leading
cause of death for those aged 15 to 35 (CDC, 2015). Numerous laws and regulations, such
as mandatory seatbelt use, speed limits, and blood alcohol concentration (BAC) limits, have
been enacted in order to promote road safety. Most developed countries have an elaborate
penalty catalogue in place that aims to punish and deter traffic o↵enders. Temporary license
suspensions are a crucial component of these penalty catalogues. This measure not only
incapacitates traffic o↵enders by taking them o↵ the streets for a short period of time. It is
also supposed to provide a “shot across the bows” by prompting o↵enders, who temporarily
experience the inconveniences of life without a driver’s license, to change their ways in the
long-run and drive more responsibly once they get their license back.
Yet, little is known about the e↵ectiveness of temporary license suspensions. Economic theory provides little guidance on this issue. On the one hand, Gary Becker’s (1974)
model of the “rational criminal” predicts that temporary license suspensions should have no
long-run e↵ects. In this classical model, criminals weigh the expected costs of committing a
crime against the expected benefits. As long as a temporary license suspension has no e↵ect
on the degree of a penalty for future transgression (e.g. through a three strike law), the
measure should not change this cost-benefit-trade-o↵. Traffic o↵enders are therefore just as
likely to commit another transgression before a temporary license suspension as they are after they get their license back. On the other hand, the behavioral approach to the economics
of crime (Jolls et al., 1998, among others) o↵ers many channels through which a temporary
2

license suspension might indeed have an e↵ect. For instance, o↵enders might update their
beliefs about the actual cost of punishments or the probability that an o↵ense is detected.
This is therefore ultimately an empirical issue. As Levitt and Miles (2007) point out,
the main challenge for empiricists is to distinguish causation from correlation. A naive comparison of the recidivism behavior of o↵enders who were punished for their criminal acts with
those who were not, cannot shed much light on the question of how e↵ective penalties are
in deterring future crimes. After all, these penalties are not randomly assigned. People who
get punished because they committed a crime might be intrinsically prone to committing
crimes. Comparing their rates of recidivism to those of law abiding citizens is thus an apples
to oranges comparison. Traffic transgressions are no exception to this problem. As shown
below, a “naive” OLS regression yields a positive e↵ect of license suspension on recidivism
even when conditioning on age, sex, and state fixed e↵ects.
This illustrates the challenges in answering a seemingly simple question. The goal of
this paper is to overcome these challenges. For that purpose, I exploit a little known but
widely applied rule in the German penalty catalogue for traffic violations which leads to a
quasi-random suspension of some individuals’ driver’s licenses. Specifically, this rule maintains that a person who commits two major speeding violations within 365 days, should have
her license revoked for one month. This gives rise to a fuzzy regression discontinuity design
where those to the left of the 365-day cuto↵ are likely to have their license revoked while
those to the right of the cuto↵ retain theirs. The rule appears to be obscure and complex
enough to prevent sorting to the right of the threshold. At the same time, the rule is very
much enforced by the traffic authorities. I find that a loss of license for one month reduces
the probability of recidivating within a year by about 20 percent. This result is robust to
the choice of di↵erent time windows and estimation techniques.

3
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Background and Institutional Framework
Endogeneity issues in the relationship between punishment and criminal activity have

been recognized since at least the late 1990s (Levitt, 1996). Ever since, economists have come
up with various strategies to exploit some source of exogenous variation in order to isolate
causal e↵ects of punishment on recidivism. Kessler and Levitt (1999) exploit sentence enhancements that are exogenously induced by California’s Proposition 8 to evaluate the e↵ect
of harsher sentences on crime. They find that harsher punishments reduce crime substantially. Helland and Tabarrok (2007) utilize idiosyncrasies in the same state’s three strike
policy to isolate a large and significant deterrence e↵ect of the policy. Lee and McCrary
(2009) use the fact that juvenile criminals tend to be sentenced as adults once they turn
eighteen, and find only small deterrence e↵ects of more severe penalties.
Drago et al. (2009) analyze sentence reductions for certain parts of the Italian prison
population due to a collective clemency bill. Their results suggest that a reduction in prison
sentences actually reduced recidivism. Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2013) use Argentinian
judges’ ideological di↵erences as an instrument in evaluating the e↵ectiveness of electronic
monitoring compared to incarceration. They find that this more lenient treatment reduces
recidivism. Green and Winik (2010) and Aizer and Doyle (2015) exploit the random assignment of criminals to judges with di↵erent incarceration tendencies (an identification strategy
pioneered by Kling (2006)) and find that juvenile imprisonment increases recidivism probabilities and has adverse e↵ects on human capital accumulation. In the arena of traffic
violations, DeAngelo and Hansen (2014) show that a mass layo↵ of Oregon State Police in
2003 was associated with large increases in accidents and traffic fatalities. In a separate
study, Hansen (2015) exploits blood alcohol content (BAC) cuto↵s that determine whether
a transgression is treated as a driving under the influence (DUI) o↵ense, or even an aggravated DUI o↵ense. His regression discontinuity results suggest that getting caught behind
the wheel with a BAC just above the DUI threshold reduces recidivism by 17 percent.
My study is similar in spirit in that it exploits an exogenous increase in the severity
of the penalty for a speeding o↵ense to isolate the causal e↵ect of a 1-month license sus4

pension on repeat o↵enders. The source of this exogenous variation is an idiosyncrasy in
the German traffic penalty catalogue. This catalogue generally provides for three di↵erent
types of penalties: money fines, (demerit) points entered into one’s central traffic registry
account, and license suspensions. The degree of the penalty is determined by the seriousness of the o↵ense. Table 1 provides an excerpt from the penalty catalogue, specifically for
speeding o↵enses. Small transgressions, such as driving 10 km/h over the stipulated speed
limit, are fined with small financial penalties. For more severe transgressions, points in the
central traffic registry are added. The point system in Germany is similar to those in place
in most EU countries and several US states. Points received from di↵erent transgressions
and di↵erent types of transgressions (speeding, DUIs, running red lights, etc.) accumulate.
If a person does not commit a transgression for two years, then all points are erased. If a
person does commit a transgression within two years, however, new points are added to the
existing stock and the two year expungement period starts afresh. An o↵ender permanently
loses her license once her stock of points rises to 18.1
Finally, for severe transgressions, temporary license suspensions are handed out on
top of points and money fines. For instance, a person speeding 45 km/h over the limit will
have her license suspended for 1 month. The penalty catalogue also distinguishes between
o↵enses that took place on highways and o↵enses that took place in built-up areas, e.g. residential neighborhoods. Fines di↵er in severity for di↵erent types of transgressions ranging
from aggravated DUIs to driving without appropriate snow chains.2
The road traffic law (BKatV), which constitutes the legal basis for the penalty catalogue, also has multiple additional provisions. The legal text is currently in its 87th edition,
has 3290 pages, and weighs about five pounds. One additional provision is for “persistent
delinquencies.” It maintains that “a temporary license suspension [of usually 1 month] shall
ordinarily be handed out if the operator of a motor vehicle commits a speeding transgression
1

The point system was reformed in May 2014; all information therefore refers to the law prior to this

reform.
2
The current version of the German penalty catalogue for traffic o↵enses can be found at
http://www.kba.de
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of at least 26 km/h within 1 year after another speeding transgression of at least 26km/h
has been committed and the corresponding penalty has obtained legal force” (§4 Abs. 2 Satz
2 BKatV; own translation). This provision will henceforth be referred to as the “365-day
rule.” For instance, a person who within a few months is caught twice exceeding the speed
limit on a highway by 28 km/h falls under the 365-day rule and will have her license temporarily revoked even though, according to the penalty catalogue, she should on aggregate
only be fined e160 and receive 6 demerit points (see Table 1). Note that the wording of the
provision is tricky. If you read the above text carefully, you will notice that the period, in
which an o↵ender is at risk of falling under the 365-day rule, only begins after the penalty
for the first transgression “has obtained legal force.” The di↵erence between the date of the
transgression and the date on which the associated penalty obtains legal force might seem
minor at first yet the median di↵erence between those two dates is 66 days. In other words,
the day count which determines whether an o↵ender has her license suspended due to the
365-day rule does not start immediately after committing the first transgression but with a
substantial time lag. This wrinkle in the law is a big source of confusion among o↵enders and
- as we will see in Section 4 - prevents sorting to the right of the 365-day cuto↵. Fortunately,
both the date of a transgressions and the date on which the corresponding penalties obtain
legal force are recorded in the data, so I can properly ascertain which o↵enders fall under
the rule.
The 365-day rule provides a cuto↵ that can be exploited in a regression discontinuity
setting. For instance, this rule requires that a person who commits her second transgression
within 365 days after the penalty for the initial transgression has obtained legal force, should
have her licenses suspended for one month. A person who commits her second transgression
on day 366 should keep her license. By comparing the recidivism behavior of these two groups
of people, who should be very similar except for the degree of the penalty they receive, I can
obtain an unbiased estimate of the e↵ect of a 1-month driver’s license suspension.
My identification strategy rests on two assumptions that need to be met to guarantee
internally valid estimates. First, drivers by and large must not be aware of this regulation
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or, at the very least, they should not gear their driving behavior accordingly. For instance,
this assumption would be violated if drivers drove more recklessly once 365 days have passed
since the penalty for a previous major speeding transgression obtained legal force. In Section 4, I will test this assumption. The data will support this assumption and will show
that sorting to either side of the 365-day cuto↵ is not common, most likely because the
wording of the provision is not straightforward and the rule is somewhat obscure. Second,
traffic authorities must enforce this regulation. It is apparent from the above quote that the
authorities only “shall ordinarily” hand out licenses suspension and thus have considerable
wiggle room. But, Section 4 will also show that the authorities to a great degree adhere to
this rule, thus creating a discontinuity in the assignment of drivers to license suspensions.

3

Data
The source of data for this study is the German central traffic registry (“Verkehrszen-

tralregister” or VZR). The VZR is administered and maintained by the Federal Motor Transport Authority (“Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt” or KBA) which is based in Flensburg, Germany.
The VZR contains an account with a unique ID for every traffic o↵ender who has committed
a transgression that was sanctioned with at least one demerit point. O↵enses are usually
first recorded by local traffic authorities. These local agencies then transmit information on
the date and type of transgression as well as the corresponding penalty to the KBA. In some
instances, this information is transmitted by the courts rather than local traffic agencies.
The transmissions also contain information about the o↵ender’s sex, age, state of residence,
as well as the date on which a penalty obtains legal force.
The VZR is an active registry. Persons who do not commit a traffic transgression for
two years not only get their points total set to zero, but are erased entirely from the data
base.3 If someone commits a transgression after her account has been erased due to this
3

This expungement rule was changed during the 2014 reform of the VZR. Now, each o↵ense is associated

with a unique expungement period depending on the severity of the o↵ense. In this study only data pre-dating
this reform are used.
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2-year expungement period, she starts with a clean slate. That is, she receives a new ID and
cannot be linked to former VZR entries. The VZR was digitalized in 1999. O↵enders who
have entries dating back beyond 1999 that have not been expunged yet, are still administered
using paper files. For this study only o↵enders who are administered using digital files (and
thus show up in the data base) could be used. While every citizen has a right to enquire
his point total, the data in the VZR are usually not made available to outside researchers.
What is more, new entries and deletions changes the composition of the VZR everyday.
Fortunately, the point system was reformed on 1 May 2014. On this occasion, a dataset
containing the digital VZR population as of 30 April 2014 was created. The KBA kindly
made an anonymized version of this excerpt available to me for on-site analysis. The data
set contains more than 10.5 million entries pertaining to about 6.3 million distinct o↵enders.
Obviously not all observations in this dataset can be used for this study. For one,
a sufficiently large follow-up period is required since my main outcome of interest is recidivism. For example, transgressions that occurred on April 29th 2014 cannot be used for this
analysis due to the lack of a follow-up period. More importantly, this study tries to isolate
exogeneous variation in the severity of punishment to assess the e↵ect of license suspensions
on recidivism. This exogeneous shock is induced by the above mentioned 365-day rule, so
only o↵enders who have a chance to be a↵ected by this rule should be used for analysis. The
following steps describe the selection process that identifies observations that become part
of my “experiment.”
First, it should be noted that the 365-day rule only applies to speeding transgressions
of 26km/h or more. More precisely, a 1-month license suspension may be imposed on speeders whose o↵ense by itself would not have resulted in a license suspensions. As can be seen
from Table 1, there are two cases that qualify for this rule: speeding 26-40 km/h above the
limit on highways and speeding 26-30 km/h above the limit in built-up areas. Second, the
rule can only a↵ect persons who have previously committed another speeding transgression
of 26km/h or more. Throughout this article, I will refer to the earlier of these two transgressions as the “original transgression” and the second transgression will be referred to as the
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“treatment transgression.” When I refer to the time di↵erence between the treatment and
the original transgression, I am referring to the number of days that have passed between
the date on which the penalty for the original transgression obtained legal force and the date
of the treatment transgression. In other words, throughout this paper, I account for the
wrinkle in the law that delays the start of the day count. Only persons who have both an
original transgression and a treatment transgression (i.e. two speeding o↵enses of 26km/h or
more) can enter the final “discontinuity sample”. I also require the time di↵erence between
both transgressions to be no more than 545 days and at least 186 days.4 In essence, this
puts a 180-day window around the 365-day threshold that determines whether a 1-month
driver’s license suspension is issued. I will assess the robustness of my results to di↵erent
time windows around the cuto↵ in Section 5.
The outcome of interest is recidivism, i.e. the probability of committing yet another
(third) o↵ense. This by itself requires a sufficiently large post-treatment time window. This
time window has to be even larger since it can take a few months for transgressions to show
up in the data. For example, o↵enders may appeal against prescribed penalties in court.
Transmission to the KBA and recording information into the VZR also takes some time. On
average, it takes about two months from the date of the actual o↵ense until it shows up in
the data base, after 5 months more than 99% of incidents actually show up in the data. My
observational period ends on 30 April 2014. Accounting for an at-most 5 month delay and in
order to evaluate a 12 months recidivism window, only o↵enders who have committed their
treatment transgression before 1 December 2012 can be used in this analysis.
Another complication arises from the 2-year expungement period. Individuals who do
not commit a traffic transgression for two years are erased from the data set. By inversion,
individuals who still are in the data base must have committed an o↵ense in the past two
years. That is, individuals who committed an o↵ense before 1 May 2012 must necessarily
have committed another o↵ense subsequently. For these individuals there will thus be no
variation in the outcome. As a result, individuals whose treatment transgression predates
4

Again, this is accounting for the lag caused by the time that passes between the day of the original

transgression and the day on which the penalty for this transgression has obtained legal force.
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May 1 2012 also need to be excluded from the discontinuity sample.
Figure 1 illustrates the generation of my final sample. Only observations who have
their treatment transgression within the dashed frame (1 May 2012 or later, but before 1
December 2012) can be used for the analysis. Take person A at the top of the graph whose
transgressions over time are illustrated by triangles. This person has a transgression within
the framed time period, but this is her original transgression, not her treatment transgression.
Her (second) treatment transgression is outside the dashed frame, as indicated by a second
triangle. Moreover, this person reo↵ends as there is yet another triangle further to the right.
I would most likely fail to observe this recidivism event, however, since it takes place after 1
December 2013 and thus may not yet show up in the data. Person A is therefore excluded
from my sample. Person B, on the other hand, will be included in the sample. Her treatment
transgression falls into the framed area, giving me a sufficiently large time-window to detect
recdivating behavior. In this instance, person B indeed recidivates within 12 months which I
observe. Person C is similar and will also be included in my sample. The main di↵erence to
person B is that person C does not recidivate. Since I allow for a sufficiently large follow-up
period, I can be sure that as a matter of fact there was no further transgression in the year
following the treatment transgression. In other words, the lack of another o↵ense for this
person is not due to lagged reporting. Finally, person D and everyone else who has their
treatment transgression prior to 1 May 2012, by virtue of the expungement period, must
necessarily have recidivated. Otherwise, they would no longer be in the sample. That is,
there is no variation in the outcome for these observations, leading me to drop person D.
Once these restrictions have been imposed, a “discontinuity sample” emerges. It consists of 31,400 persons. Each person has a treatment transgression that occurred between
1 May 2012 and 30 November 2012; each person also has a original transgression for which
the date on which the corresponding penalty has obtained legal force predates the date of
the treatment transgression by at least 186 days and at most 545 days. For about half the
sample, 365 days or less passed between these two points in time. Borrowing terminology
from the potential outcome framework (Angrist et al., 1996), these observations constitute
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the “treatment group”. Members of this group fall under the 365-day-rule and should have
their licenses suspended for 1 month. The remainder of the discontinuity sample constitute
the “control group”. Members of this group have committed similar transgressions but due
to the timing of their o↵enses mostly retain their driver’s license. Persons in both treatment
and control group may or may not recidivate, i.e. may or may not have committed a (third)
major traffic transgression after their treatment transgressions.
If the descriptive statistics of Table 2 are any indication, it appears as if license suspensions have an e↵ect. Rates of recidivism are 24.4% and 26.5% for the treatment and
control group, respectively. These di↵erences are statistically significant at the 1% level (see
row 10 and columns (1) and (2) of Table 2). The di↵erence actually tends to increase the
more I limit the sample to observations with treatment transgressions closer to the 365-day
cuto↵. On the other hand, demographic factors that are reported with the data are quite
balanced across treatment and control group, indicating a quasi-random separation of the
sample. For instance, the average age in the treatment sample is 42.66 years, in the control
sample it is 43.02. The null hypothesis that there is no di↵erence in means cannot be rejected
at the 1% level. The means for all other covariates are also very similar, and formal t-tests
for di↵erences in means fail to reject the null in the vast majority of instances.
I also distinguish between speeding-specific recidivism and general recidivism. The
bottom two rows of Table 2 provide the corresponding means and standard deviations. Since
1-month license suspensions are quasi-randomly assigned due to a speeding incidence, one
might hypothesize that speeding recidivism is particularly deterred. Therefore a dummy is
defined that equals one if another speeding transgression occurs after the treatment transgression. The equivalent dummy for general recidivism is equal to one if any transgression
(DUI, speeding, running a red light,...) is recorded in the post-treatment period.
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Methods
The goal of this study is to exploit the exogeneous variation in penalties induced by

the 365-day rule. The rule maintains that a 1-month license suspension shall be levied on
o↵enders who - accounting for the wrinkle in the law that delays the start of the day count
- commit two major speeding transgressions within 365 days, but not on those who commit
two such transgressions within 366 days or more. This will allow for the identification of
the causal e↵ect of a temporary license suspension on the probability of reo↵ending. My
identification strategy will only be valid if the 365-day rule is actually applied and results
in a discontinuity in the assignment to treatment. Figure 2 illustrates that this is indeed
the case. The x-axis shows the running variable, i.e. the number of days that have passed
between the date on which the penalty for the original transgression has obtained legal force
and the date of the treatment transgression. For each bin, I calculate the fraction of o↵enders within that bin who have had their license suspended for 1 month. The position of each
point relative to the y-axis yields information about these fractions.
If the 365-day rule was strictly applied, everybody to the left of the red vertical line
should have her license suspended for 1 month in addition to the prescribed money and point
penalties. Everybody to the right or on the line should keep their license and merely su↵er
the prescribed money and point penalties. Such a “sharp” separation into treatment and
control group is not present in this case. There is, however, a big drop in the probability of
having one’s license temporary revoked at day 366. To the left of the cuto↵ around three
quarters of o↵enders lose their license for 1 month and to the right of the cuto↵ a mere 1.7
percent of o↵enders are hit with a 1-month license suspension. In other words, there is a
huge drop in the probability of having one’s license suspended due to the treatment transgression once 365 days have passed since the penalty for the original transgression obtained
legal force. Likely reasons for receiving the treatment on the “wrong” side of the cuto↵ are
involvement in an accident or repeat o↵ending in terms of non-speeding transgressions.5 In
5

Cases in which exactly 366 days have passed between the original transgresion and the treatment trans-

gressions have their licenses suspended more frequently than most other cases to the right of the cuto↵. A
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such instances, the local traffic authorities may mandate a temporary license suspension.
The reasons for imperfect compliance on the left hand side are numerous. In instances very
close to the cuto↵, local traffic authorities or judges may be lenient and choose to not invoke
the 365-day rule. In cases of hardship, for example elderly or disabled drivers who have no
other means of transportation than their vehicles, local traffic authorities or judges may also
be lenient. Similarly, o↵enders from rural areas, commuters who are dependent on their car,
or professional truck drivers might be able to keep their licenses. In general, any penalty
notice can be appealed in court and judges may override a suspension if the o↵ender shows
remorse or accepts a higher monetary and/or point penalty in lieu of the temporary license
suspension.6
By and large, traffic authorities follow the 365-day rule which induces a big drop in
the probability of having one’s license temporarily suspended at the expected threshold. It
makes sense, therefore, to take a look at the relationship between the outcomes and the
running variable. Figure 3 plots the two recidivism outcomes of interest against the number
of days that have passed between the date on which the penalty for the original transgression
obtained legal force and the date of the treatment transgression. The running variable is
aggregated into 3-day bins. The size of each circle indicates the number of observations in
each bin. The position of each circle, relative to the y-axis, indicates the fraction of o↵enders within a bin who recidivated within 12 months. The recidivism period is extended to
13 months for those who actually have had their license suspended for 1 month in order
to account for incapacitation e↵ects as drivers without a license naturally have less of an
opportunity to reo↵end.
In Figure 3a there is clearly a discontinuity at the 366-day cuto↵. This jump yields
a first rough estimate of the reduced form (intent-to-treat) e↵ect. The graph suggests that
likely reason is that 2012 was a leap year which may have led to confusion among the local traffic authorities
as to whether these cases should fall under the 365-day rule.
6
Note that this kind of selection issue is not a threat to my identification strategy. Rather it illustrates
the local interpretation of any regression discontinuity coefficient. This issue will be further discussed in
Section 7.
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o↵enders who are assigned to treatment (i.e. license suspensions) are three to four percentage points less likely to recidivate than o↵enders who are not assigned to treatment. Figure
3b focuses on speeding recidivism. Here the discontinuity is less obvious, but there still
appears to be a jump of about 2 percentage points at the 366-day threshold. Note that the
lowess lines in both figures are merely superimposed to better visualize the pattern in the
data but may very well su↵er from boundary bias close to the 365-day cuto↵. In order to
obtain a visual estimate of the size of the treatment e↵ect it is more important to focus on
the position of the cloud of points, especially around the cuto↵, than to study the position
of the lowess lines at the boundary.
Figures 2 and 3 make a compelling case that a) the 365-day rule invokes a quasirandom assignment of license suspensions and b) this assignment indeed has an e↵ect on
future recidivism behavior. However, the internal validity of any coefficient obtained through
this setup would be in jeopardy if o↵enders were very much aware of the 365-day cuto↵ and
geared their driving behavior accordingly. Fortunately, there is little indication that this
is the case. First, anecdotal evidence suggests that the vast majority of drivers is not even
aware that this rule exists. There is a vast amount of online forums in which repeat o↵enders
who fall under the 365-day rule express their shock about their license suspensions. Second,
the wrinkle in the provision that starts the day count only after the penalty for the original
transgression has obtained legal force, makes it hard for o↵enders to keep track of whether
they are still at risk of falling under the 365-day rule. That is, if they were aware of the
exact wording of the law to begin with.
Data back up this claim. If at least some drivers were aware of the 365-day rule
and all its wrinkles, and were able to keep track of the exact day count, one would expect
“bunching” on the right-hand side of the 365-day cuto↵. Drivers would drive more carefully
than usual until the 365-day rule no longer applied to them. This would result in a spike
of traffic transgressions on days 366-400. Yet Figure 4 gives little indication that this is
indeed the case. The frequency of treatment transgressions (in 3-day bins) is very evenly
distributed with around 100 transgressions per day on each side of the cuto↵. Most notably,
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there is no spike in treatment transgressions from o↵enders whose penalties for their original
transgression obtained legal force just a bit more than 365 days ago. One might be mildly
concerned about the small drop in the transgression frequency on days 360-362. Yet, the
frequency rebounds to above-average levels on days 363-365. Drops in frequency of even
greater magnitude can also be observed elsewhere in the distribution. This visual analysis is
consistent with McCrary’s (2008) more explicit density test for manipulation at the cuto↵.
The test implies a log di↵erence in height of -.021 with a standard error of 0.033. In other
words, the null hypothesis that there is no manipulation at the cuto↵ cannot be rejected at
any reasonable level of significance. Frandsen (2013) has pointed out that McCrary’s (2008)
density test might be inconsistent for discrete running variables, such as the day count in
this application. He has developed a test with preferable finite sample properties for such a
scenario. Frandsen’s (2013) test yields a p-value of 0.224, thus confirming that manipulation
at the cuto↵ is unlikely. By and large, there is no indication of any bunching or any increase
in frequency just to the right of the cuto↵.
A related threat to the internal validity of the design is di↵erential sorting of o↵enders
to either side of the cuto↵. For instance, more experienced drivers could be more aware of
the 365-day rule and thus sort to the right of the cuto↵. Again, the data give little indication that this is the case. Figure 5a plots the average age for 3-day bins against the running
variable. Age should be a reasonable proxy for driving experience. There is no sign of either
a jump or drop at the cuto↵ or anywhere else in the distribution. Figure 5b repeats this
exercise treating the percentage of female drivers in each 3-day bin as the outcome. Women
generally commit substantially fewer traffic transgressions. Yet again there is no jump in
the percentage of female o↵enders at the 366-day cuto↵. This suggests that female drivers
are as unaware of the 365-day rule as their male peers.7 Finally, I evaluate the number
of prior o↵enses in the same way. The idea here is that habitual o↵enders might be more
knowledgeable of the penalty catalogue and the 365-day provision and might therefore be
7

As noted earlier, the lowess lines are merely included to show general patterns in the data. The small

gap on both sides of the cuto↵s is probably due to boundary bias, but there is certainly no discontinuity in
the position of the point cloud.
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more likely to “play” the law. But again, there is little indication of a jump or drop in the
average number of priors, neither around the cuto↵ nor anywhere else.

Overall, there is no indication of any sorting behavior. This suggests that the 365day rule is obscure enough to lead to a random separation of o↵enders into a treatment and
control group, yet it is enforced to such a degree that the take-up among those who are
assigned to treatment is substantially higher than among those not assigned to treatment.
The treatment here is, of course, a 1-month driver’s license suspension. This gives rise to
a fuzzy regression discontinuity (RD) design which is implemented as a 2SLS instrumental
variable regression. One of the main challenges in this kind of setup is to pick the correct
functional form. This is an important task in all empirical analyses but even more crucial
in a RD setting. We want to be sure that what at first glance certainly looks like a jump
in recidivism rates at the 366-day cuto↵ is not just a non-linearity in the data. A visual
inspection of a graph that plots the outcome of interest against the running variable (such as
Figure 3) provides a useful guide for picking the correct functional form. The graph reveals
no obvious non-linearities. Not least for efficiency reasons, a linear functional form therefore
seems to be appropriate. Nonetheless, I will also consider specifications using second and
third order polynomials of the running variable and interactions of these polynomials with
the treatment dummy. Gelman and Imbens (2014) show that polynomials of even higher
order do more harm than good and even the cubic version of the model might be too much.
It is still useful as a robustness check.
An alternative is a nonparametric approach, e.g. local linear regression (Hahn et al.,
2001). Lee and Card (2008), however, argue that with a discrete running variable, such
a nonparametric approach is not advisable. My running variable, the number of days between the original and the treatment transgression, is discrete but takes on many distinct
values which should mitigate concerns about the nonparametric approach. Nonetheless, this
method is only used as a robustness check. Section 6 will show that it leads to results that
are strikingly similar to those of the least flexible parametric specification. Lee and Lemieux
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(2010) also suggest that the standard errors should be clustered on the distinct values of a
discrete running variable which is done throughout the paper. The second stage regression
in my 2SLS model is modeled as follows:
Reci =

0

+

1 Xi

+ ( 2 Xi2 +

3
3 Xi )

+

0 D̂i

+

2
1 D̂i Xi (+ 2 D̂i Xi

+

3
3 D̂i Xi )

+ ✏i

(1)

where Xi is the running variable, that is the number of days that have passed between the
date on which the penalty for the original transgression obtained legal force and the date of
the treatment transgression of o↵ender i. As is best practice in an RD setting (Lee, 2008),
the running variable is centered around the cuto↵. Di is a dummy indicating whether, due to
the treatment transgression, o↵ender i had her license suspended for 1 month. This dummy
is instrumented for (see below) thus the hat-superscript in equation (1). Reci is a dummy
equal to one if o↵ender i recidivates and commits a (third) o↵ense within 12 months after
the treatment transgression.8

0

is the coefficient of interest and yields the treatment e↵ect

of a 1-month license suspension on the probability of recidivating within a year. In order to
assess more flexible functional forms, the polynomials and interaction terms in parentheses
can be added to the model. Since assignment to treatment is fuzzy, a first stage regression,
yielding the predicted values D̂i , is necessary:

Di =

0

+

1 Xi

+ ( 2 Xi2 +

3
3 Xi )

+ ⇡0 Ti + ⇡1 Ti Xi (+⇡2 Ti Xi2 + ⇡3 Ti Xi3 ) + ⌘i

(2)

where Ti = 1(Xi < 366). In other words, Ti indicates assignment to treatment and Di
indicates whether the treatment was in fact taken up. Of course, in the specifications using
higher order polynomials, the first stage is constructed such that the model is exactly identified and { Di , Di Xi , Di Xi2 , Di Xi3 } are instrumented for by { Ti , Ti Xi , Ti Xi2 , Ti Xi3 }.
All models are also run with a vector of covariates included in the regression. Controls
are o↵ender i’s age, sex, her number of prior o↵enses, and regional dummies for her place
of residence. This provides an additional check on the internal validity of my estimates.
8

As mentioned above, the evaluated recidivism period is extended to 13 months for those who actually

receive the treatment in order to account for incapacitation e↵ects as drivers without a license naturally have
less of an opportunity to reo↵end.
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The covariates are balanced across treatment and control group so that the point estimates
should not be a↵ected by the inclusion of control variables. We will see in the next section
that this is indeed the case.

5
5.1

Results
Reduced Form Results
The reduced form results of Table 3 yield the intent-to-treat (ITT) e↵ect, i.e. the

e↵ect of assignment to treatment. O↵enders who committed their treatment transgression
within 365 days after the penalty for the original transgression had obtained legal force, are
about three percentage points less likely to recidivate within 12 months than o↵enders who
do not fall under the 365-day rule. This finding is robust to the inclusion of covariates.
Changes to the functional form also have no e↵ect on the point estimates, but result in
small losses of precision. The average rate of recidivism is 25.4 percent, so these coefficients
translate into a decrease in the rate of recidivism of about 12 percent. This result is also
consistent with a visual analysis of Figure 3a which illustrates the ITT and would suggest
an e↵ect size of a similar magnitude.
Panel B of Table 3 shows the reduced form results with respect to speeding-specific
recidivism. One might expect that future speeding o↵enses are deterred in particular since
temporary license suspensions are imposed as a result of past speeding transgressions. Column (1) indicates that falling under the 365-day rule reduces the rate of speeding recidivism
by about 2 percentage points. This translates into a reduction in speeding-specific recidivism
of about 11 percent, indicating that speeding-specific recidivism is a↵ected by the penalty
just as much as any other kind of recidivism. This result is robust to including a set of
covariate variables. The result is also consistent with Figure 3b which would suggest an
e↵ect of similar magnitude. The point estimate is fairly robust to changes in the functional
form. However, in specifications in which a quadratic or cubic version of the running variable and the corresponding interactions with Ti are included, the standard errors increase
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substantially and the coefficient is no longer statistically significantly di↵erent from zero.
This is most likely a power issue. I have calculated the minimum detectable e↵ect (MDE)
using the following formula provided by Jacob et al. (2012):
s
(1 RY2 ) Y2
M DE = 2.8
N P (1 P )(1 RT2 )

(3)

where RY2 and RT2 are obtained from a regression of Reci and Ti , respectively on the running
variable and other covariates.

2
Y

is the variance in outcome in the control group, N is the

sample size, and P is the proportion of sample members in the treatment group. The MDE
is the smallest treatment e↵ect that my setup has a reasonable chance of detecting. For
speeding recidivism, it is 0.017 which is very close to the point estimates. As a result, we
may have trouble detecting a statistically significant e↵ect on speeding recidivism using specifications with higher order polynomials which are slightly less efficient than the linear setup.9

5.2

2SLS Second Stage Results
Instrumental variable estimates for the e↵ect of a 1-month license suspension on the

probability of recidivating within 12 months are reported in Table 4. The linear model
without any controls suggests that a 1-month license suspension reduces the probability of
committing a major traffic transgression within the next year by 5 percentage points. Adding
covariate controls does not alter this point estimate substantially. A model containing an
additional quadratic term of the running variable and its interaction with the suspension
indicator comes to virtually the same result. The coefficient is -.052 with a standard error
of .021, and it is also robust to the inclusion of covariates. The cubic model yields similar
results with a coefficient of -.057 and a standard error of .024. Given a mean recidivism rate
of 25.4 percent, these coefficients translate into reductions of recidivating behavior by 19 to
22 percent.
9

The MDE for recidivism in general is 0.018, so power issues should not be a concern for the main

outcome.
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Columns (3) through (10) assess the robustness of my results to picking an ever
smaller time window around the 365-day cuto↵. For instance, column (3) focuses on offenders who committed their treatment transgression between 276 and 455 days after the
penalties for their original transgressions had obtained legal force. In essence, this creates a
90-day window to both sides of the 365-day cuto↵. It is comforting to see that the point estimates remain very stable. If we further zoom in on the cuto↵, the point estimates continue
to hover around -.05. Not surprisingly, the standard errors inflate substantially as would
be expected since the sample size shrinks with an ever closer window around the cuto↵.
Wooldridge (2009) also points out that there are more than just efficiency costs to limiting
the sample to observations just around the cuto↵. His simulations show that this might substantially bias the coefficient of interest. Therefore, the results using a smaller time window
merely serve as a robustness check. The specification that uses the full sample (i.e. column
(2)) is the preferred specification.
The selection of a preferred functional form is another challenge in my setting. A
visual inspection of Figure 3 finds little indication of a non-linear relationship between the
running variable and the outcome. For efficiency reasons, the linear specification might
therefore be preferred. I also conducted a Chi-Squared (Wald) version of the formal F-test
suggested by Lee and Lemieux (2010). For this test, a set of dummies for 3-day bins of the
running variables is added to the 2SLS regression. It is then tested whether this set of dummies is jointly significant. If it is not, this is a sign that the original regression (without the
bin dummies) is not underspecified. If the dummies are jointly significant, then higher-order
polynomials of the running variable should be added to better fit the data. The p-values of
this test are reported below each coefficient and standard error pair in Table 4. The set of
bin-dummies is insignificant in all specifications, indicating that higher order polynomials
are not needed here. It is nonetheless comforting that both the quadratic and the cubic
specification yield point estimates that are very similar to those of the linear specification.
If we discount the findings from columns (9) and (10) which will likely su↵er from both
consistency and efficiency issues, the coefficient range stretches from -0.029 to -0.071 and is
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thus hovering around the preferred -.048 estimate yielded by the linear specification using
covariates and the full discontinuity sample.
The second stage results are also strikingly di↵erent from the “naive” OLS regression
results of Table 6. The estimates in this table are based on the population of all of the about
2 million o↵enders who committed a major traffic violation in Germany between May 2012
and December 2012. Some of these o↵enses were punished with a temporary license suspension. Here, I also regress a dummy indicating whether a person commits yet another traffic
violation within one year on a dummy indicating whether a person’s license was suspended
following her initial transgression. Column (1) shows that there is a positive relationship
between punishment and recidivism. That is, persons who have had their license suspended
are more likely to recidivate. This relationship is robust to the inclusion of a set of control
variables such as age and sex. Of course, nobody would argue that the “naive” OLS results
document a causal relationship. Drivers who get punished might drive faster cars, be less
risk-averse, or di↵er from unpunished drivers in many other unobservable dimensions. A simple OLS model fails to pick up these di↵erences between punished and unpunished drivers.
My regression discontinuity design, on the other hand, solves this issue because the 365-day
rule ensures quasi-random assignment into treatment and control group. The treated who
have their license suspended for 1 month do not di↵er in terms of either observable or unobservable characteristics from control members of the discontinuity sample who get to keep
their licenses. In other words, the 2SLS regression yields a causal e↵ect whereas the “naive”
OLS merely reflects correlations. The di↵erence between the two approaches turns out to
be very substantial.
The results for speeding-specific recidivism are presented in Table 5. A linear model
suggests that a 1-month license suspension due to the treatment transgression reduces the
probability that another speeding o↵ense is committed within 12 months by about 3 percentage points. This e↵ect is statistically significant and robust to the inclusion of covariates.
This translates into a reduction by 17 percent, given a mean rate of speeding-specific recidivism of 18.4 percent. The results for speeding-specific recidivism are, however, much

21

less robust to changes in specification and adjustments of the period under observation. A
quadratic and cubic model using the full sample yield smaller coefficients of -0.022 and -0.020,
respectively and also lead to much larger standard errors than the linear model. Moreover,
if I zoom in on observations very close to the cuto↵, I lose a lot of precision and some of
the point estimates have a positive sign. A series of Wald-test indicates that a linear model
should be the preferred model which makes the statistically significant -0.030 coefficient in
column (2) the most trusted estimate. Nonetheless, their lack of robustness make the results
for speeding-specific recidivism somewhat less reliable.

6
6.1

Robustness
Nonparametric Regression Results
The parametric approach that was employed in the previous section uses all observa-

tions, each of which carries the same weight regardless of how far away from the cuto↵ it is.
However, the argument that o↵enders are assigned to treatment in a quasi-random fashion
might be most credible for observations close to the 365 cuto↵. Yet as is apparent from
the previous section, limiting the analysis to observations right around the cuto↵ leads to
both efficiency and consistency issues. Moreover, if the functional form is correctly specified,
including observations that are further away does not lead to bias and improves precision.
Nonparametric techniques o↵er an alternative estimation approach. Instead of having the functional form determined by the analyst, a nonparametric approach ultimately lets
the data pick the appropriate functional form. An example for a nonparametric technique is
local linear regression (Hahn et al., 2001) which has some beneficial properties with respect
to boundary bias. The idea here is to fit a weighted regression within a bin with a fixed
bandwidth around the cuto↵ leading to a flexible fit. Observations that are close to the
cuto↵ carry more weight than observations further away and, in fact, some observations will
receive zero weight and not enter the analysis. By sidestepping the functional form issues,
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local linear regression reduces the chances of bias in the treatment e↵ect. However, it o↵ers
less precision. As mentioned earlier, nonparametric techniques should also be viewed with
more scrutiny when the running variable is discrete. With discrete data, there are no observations with values of the running variable just below the cuto↵ (e.g. at 365.99 days in this
application). Rather, clusters of observations are bunched together at uniform distances, so
comparing observations “just above” and “just below” the 365-day cuto↵ and slowly moving
across observations with slightly higher/lower values of the running variable is impossible.
Nonetheless, Calonico et al. (2014) point out that in practice when a discrete running variable has a fair amount of mass near the cuto↵, a nonparametric estimation might still yield
a good approximation of the true treatment e↵ect.
The key challenge with nonparametric techniques is bandwidth selection. There is a
trade-o↵ between bias and efficiency with larger bandwidths yielding more precise estimates
while being more susceptible to bias. Several algorithms to pick an optimal bandwidth have
been developed. They all follow a similar pattern: Starting from an initial pilot bandwidth,
an iterative procedure determines an optimal bandwidth that balances the two dimensions
of efficiency and unbiasedness. The two most popular algorithms by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011) and Calonico et al. (2014) have been implemented into software programs and
are put to work in this study. Table 7 demonstrates that the nonparametric approach yields
results that are strikingly similar to those of the parametric analysis. A 1-month license
suspension due to the treatment transgression is associated with a reduction in recidivating
behavior of 4.6 percentage points. Recall that the preferred parametric specification (column (2) in Table 4) predicted a reduction by 4.8 percentage points. The point estimate is
identical regardless of the algorithm that was used for bandwidth selection. Table 7 also
gives information on the number of observations in the sample that receive non-zero weights.
While the algorithm by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011) makes use of more than 85% of
observations, the algorithm by Calonico et al. (2014) uses only about half the sample. This
also explains di↵erences in precision. Figure 6a further attests to the non-sensitivity of my
nonparametric results to the bandwidth choice; it shows the point estimates and 95% confi-
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dence intervals over a wide range of possible bandwidth selections, including those suggested
by the above mentioned procedures. The point estimates all hover around -.05 and most of
them are statistically significant at the 5% level.
For speeding recidivism, the nonparametric results also resemble the preferred parametric results. In fact, the point estimate in column (4) of Table 7 is identical to the one in
column (1) of Table 5. Of course, the nonparametric estimates are less precise as they are
based on fewer observations. Nevertheless, the similarity in results lends additional credibility to the preferred parametric specification which predicts a reduction in speeding-recidivism
by about 3 percentage points. Furthermore, Figure 6b shows that the nonparametric estimates are relatively robust to the bandwidth choice with the point estimates all falling within
the -0.03 range.
Even though they should be taken with a grain of salt since, due to the discreteness
of the running variable, it is very comforting that, by and large, the nonparametric results
yield results very similar to those of the preferred parametric regression specification.

6.2

Recidivism Windows
In this section, I look at a variety of recidivism time windows. For one, this provides

an additional robustness check and tests whether my results are sensitive to small changes
in the recidivism time period under consideration. Second, it allows me to assess whether a
temporary license suspension deters o↵enders permanently from committing further transgressions or whether over time they revert to their old behavior. It should be noted that
the data put some restrictions on the length of recidivism time windows that can be evaluated. Section 3 and Figure 1 have explained the data selection process in detail. The
2-year expungement period and the lag between transgression date and data entry date put
a bind on this type of analysis. The maximum recidivism period that the data allows me to
reasonably evaluate is 15 months. In this analysis, o↵enders who committed their treatment
transgression between August and November 2012 are dropped from the sample. They may
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have recidivated within 15 months but their transgression might not show up in the data due
to the delay in reporting.10 Obviously such a focus on longer recidivism windows also leads
to substantial reductions in the sample size. On the other hand, evaluating smaller time
windows allows me to use additional observations thus adding precision. It should be noted
that the treated group is not forced to turn their licenses in right away. Rather, they have
to deposit their license for one month at the local traffic authority within 4 months of the
date on which the punishment takes legal e↵ect. Accounting for an additional month that
may be required to remind o↵enders that they are due to turn in their license, the smallest
time window available for evaluation is thus 6 months.
A simple comparison of point estimates for di↵erent recidivism windows would be
flawed since the average rate of recidivism fluctuates accordingly. For instance, the average
6-month recidivism rate is about 16 percent whereas the average 15-month recidivism rate is
about 33 percent. A coefficient of, say -0.08, would thus indicate a 50 percent reduction in
6-months recidivism rates but merely a roughly 25 percent reduction in 15-month recidivism.
Figure 7 therefore shows means-adjusted coefficients and confidence intervals for recidivism
windows ranging from six to fifteen months. That is, the coefficients and confidence intervals
are divided by the corresponding average recidivism rate. All results are obtained from a
set of linear parametric regressions using covariates. The e↵ect of a temporary license suspension is notably stable over time although the e↵ect size is slightly larger for longer time
windows. As would be expected, the point estimates also become less precise the longer
the time window under evaluation as the number of available observations decreases. For
all time-windows, the point estimates are negative and significantly di↵erent from zero. By
and large, Figure 7a indicates that a 1-month license suspension reduces both short-run and
long-run rates of recidivism by about 20 percent. This is not due to a short-run incapacitation e↵ect but rather suggests that o↵enders “learn their lesson” and are permanently
deterred from committing traffic transgressions.
The same exercise is repeated for speeding-specific recidivism. Figure 7b presents the
10

The recidivism window for o↵enders who lose their license for 1 month in this instance is 16 months to

account for incapacitation e↵ects.
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means-adjusted point estimates along with confidence intervals. The e↵ect range is similar;
The standard errors are slightly larger than for the general recidivism outcome. The long-run
e↵ects appear to be slightly larger than short-run e↵ects, although these di↵erences are not
statistically significant. By and large, this graph indicates that future speeding transgressions were not deterred more than other o↵enses. In fact, both e↵ect sizes and the pattern
of slightly, but not statistically significantly, larger long-term e↵ects are quite similar across
Figures 7a and 7b. This similarity and the general persistence of the e↵ect also indicate
that the reduction in recidivism is not driven by the fact that the treatment group - as a
result of being punished under the 365-days rule - simply becomes better informed about
the peculiarities of the 365-days rule.

7

Discussion and Conclusion
The impact of punishment on future criminal behavior has always been very hard

to measure. Heavy penalties are usually only handed out to o↵enders who have committed
serious crimes. Their recidivism rates are higher to begin with and the e↵ect of punishment cannot easily be distinguished from the e↵ect of unobservable characteristics of these
o↵enders such as a lower risk aversion or self-control issues. This article has exploited a
special provision in the German traffic law that results in a quasi-random assignment of
1-month driver’s license suspensions to some traffic o↵enders but not to others. Using a
fuzzy discontinuity design, I find that receiving the punishment reduces the probability of
committing another o↵ense within a year by about 20 percent. In other words, temporary
license suspensions have a large deterrent e↵ect.
This, of course, is a “local” e↵ect in two ways. First, it is local in the sense that the
estimated e↵ect is best interpreted as the e↵ect on o↵enders with values of the running variable close to the 365-day cuto↵. Yet, as the summary statistics in Table 2 show, there are few
observable di↵erences between o↵enders close and further away from the cuto↵ which leaves
some room for generalizations. Second, a fuzzy RD design is implemented using instrumen26

tal variable analysis. As a result, I obtain a Local Average Treatment E↵ect (LATE), i.e.
the e↵ect for compliers. This is the group of people who, only because they fell under the
365-day rule, had their license suspended for one month but would not have had their license
suspended otherwise. The 365-day rule by its very nature only applies to repeat o↵enders
who have committed two fairly serious speeding o↵enses. A 1-month license suspension may
a↵ect other types of o↵enders, e.g. first-time o↵enders, in a di↵erent way. The population of
habitual o↵enders is, however, clearly the population that is the most interesting to policy
makers so that my results might very well be seen as a case of “sometimes-you-get-whatyou-want” (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). After all, it is exactly this group of repeat o↵enders
committing fairly major transgressions that is most likely to actually get penalized with temporary license suspensions. My study obtains the treatment e↵ects for this very population.
One may also speculate that the deterrent e↵ect for less habitual o↵enders might be even
larger, making my estimates a lower bound for the e↵ect of license suspensions on first-time
o↵enders and o↵enders committing less severe transgressions.
The results of this article also have implications for the economic theory of crime.
License suspensions due to the 365-day rule have no e↵ect on the degree of penalties for future transgressions. As a result, they should not have an e↵ect on the cost-benefit trade-o↵
that rational criminals face in Becker’s (1974) framework. Yet, this study provides some
compelling evidence that receiving such a penalty deeply alters future behavior. My findings could be reconciled with Becker’s (1974) model if su↵ering a 1-month license suspension
prompts o↵enders, who only then realize the true costs of the penalty, to revise their expected
cost estimate upwards. This kind of “learning” behavior is also consistent with economic
models of crime in behavioral economics. Finally, the findings of this study are of great
interest to policy makers who, as of now, have very little reliable evidence regarding the
e↵ectiveness of penalties that are levied on traffic o↵enders. This article suggests that temporary license suspensions for traffic o↵enders are an e↵ective tool in reducing major traffic
violations. Incorporating this insight into future revisions of the penalty catalogue should
help prevent some of the thousands of traffic fatalities that happen everyday.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Excerpt from the German Traffic Penalty Catalogue: Speeding O↵enses
Penalization
Transgression by:

Highways

Built-Up Areas

 10 km/h

10e

15e

11 - 15 km/h

20e

25e

16 - 20 km/h

30e

35e

21 - 25 km/h

70e, 1P

80e, 1P

26 - 30 km/h

80e, 3P

100e, 3P

31 - 40 km/h

120e, 3P

160e, 3P, 1M

41 - 50 km/h

160e, 3P, 1M

200e, 4P, 1M

51 - 60 km/h

240e, 4P, 1M

280e, 4P, 2M

61 - 70 km/h

440e, 4P, 2M

480e, 4P, 3M

71 km/h

600e, 4P, 3M

680e, 4P, 3M

Each cell contains information on the penalization for speeding o↵enses. There are three types of penalties: Fines as
measured in Euros (e), central registry points (P), and temporary license suspensions in months (M). A person who has
accumulated 18 points will have her license revoked permanently. All points are erased if a person remains without a
traffic transgression for 2 years.
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32

(2)

42.66
(13.12)
0.162*
(0.368)
2.014
(1.224)
0.227
(0.419)
0.208
(0.406)
0.179
(0.383
0.366
(0.482)
0.0200
(0.140
0.244*
(0.430)
0.175*
(0.380)
16,876

Age

Female

Num. Priors

South

North

East

West

Foreign

Recidivism (Any)

Recidivism (Speeding)

Observations

14,524

0.193*
(0.395)

0.265*
(0.442)

0.0201
(0.140)

0.372
(0.483)

0.169
(0.375)

0.209
(0.406)

0.230
(0.421)

2.004
(1.183)

0.148*
(0.355)

43.02
(12.93)

451.69*
(52.28)

[366-545]

(4)

8,321

0.174*
(0.380)

0.241*
(0.428)

0.0191
(0.137)

0.363
(0.481)

0.178
(0.383)

0.208
(0.406)

0.231
(0.422)

2.000
(1.194)

0.167*
(0.373)

42.88
(13.15)

319.54*
(25.84)

[276-365]

7,771

0.195*
(0.396)

0.268*
(0.443)

0.0201
(0.140)

0.371
(0.483)

0.166
(0.372)

0.207
(0.405)

0.235
(0.424)

2.018
(1.207)

0.144*
(0.351)

42.93
(12.94)

409.44*
(25.95)

[366-455]

±90 days

(3)

(6)

5,464

0.178*
(0.383)

0.240*
(0.427)

0.0183*
(0.134)

0.366
(0.482)

0.176
(0.381)

0.212
(0.409)

0.227
(0.419)

1.986
(1.185)

0.167
(0.373)

42.78
(13.15)

334.80*
(17.32)

[306-365]

5,310

0.194*
(0.396)

0.267*
(0.442)

0.0194*
(0.138)

0.367
(0.482)

0.168
(0.374)

0.208
(0.406)

0.237
(0.425)

2.019
(1.214)

0.146
(0.353)

42.85
(13.04)

395.02*
(17.19)

[366-425]

±60 days

(5)

(8)

2,621

0.175
(0.381)

0.229*
(0.420)

0.0217
(0.146)

0.370
(0.483)

0.170
(0.376)

0.222
(0.415)

0.217
(0.413)

1.995
(1.208)

0.158
(0.365)

42.84
(13.01)

350.42*
(8.650)

[336-365]

2,730

0.195
(0.397)

0.265*
(0.442)

0.0209
(0.143)

0.364
(0.481)

0.170
(0.375)

0.208
(0.406)

0.237
(0.425)

1.993
(1.223)

0.148
(0.356)

42.88
(13.33)

380.59*
(8.691)

[366-395]

±30 days

(7)

(10)

869

0.182
(0.387)

0.232
(0.423)

0.0230
(0.150)

0.399
(0.490)

0.168
(0.374)

0.190
(0.392)

0.220
(0.415)

1.947
(1.185)

0.150
(0.358)

42.85
(12.91)

360.43*
(2.964)

[356-365]

905

0.182
(0.388)

0.255
(0.437)

0.0132
(0.114)

0.364
(0.481)

0.170
(0.376)

0.212
(0.409)

0.241
(0.428)

2.003
(1.225)

0.155
(0.362)

42.58
(13.42)

370.53*
(2.813)

[366-375]

±10 days

(9)

values that are ever closer to the cuto↵; *denotes a statistically significant di↵erence in means at the 1% level.

that fall into a 90 day window on either side of the 365-day cuto↵. Columns (5) to (10) show means and standard deviations for observations with running variable

descriptive statistics for the full analysis sample. In columns (3) and (4) descriptive statistics are listed for observations which have values in the running variable

Table of means, standard deviations in parentheses. Data source is the digital German traffic registry database as of 30 April 2014. Columns (1) and (2) show

274.46*
(51.48)

Time

[186-365]

Full Sample

(1)

Table 2: Summary Statistics

Table 3: Reduced Form Regression Results
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.033⇤⇤⇤

0.031⇤⇤⇤

0.033⇤⇤⇤

0.031⇤⇤

0.032⇤⇤

0.032⇤⇤

Panel A: Recidivism (Any)
Below Cuto↵

(0.009)

(0.009)

(0.012)

(0.012)

(0.014)

(0.014)

0.014

0.013

0.010

0.010

Panel B: Recidivism (Speeding)
Below Cuto↵

0.020⇤⇤⇤

0.019⇤⇤

(0.008)

(0.008)

(0.011)

(0.011)

(0.012)

(0.012)

Observations

31,400

31,383

31,400

31,383

31,400

31,383

Convariates

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Linear

Linear

Quadratic

Quadratic

Cubic

Cubic

Model

Notes: ⇤ ⇤ ⇤/ ⇤ ⇤/⇤ indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by distinct values of the running variable.
Each column reports coefficients and standard errors from the reduced form OLS regression. Dependent variable in Panel A is a
dummy indicating whether a person commits any traffic o↵ense within a year of her (second) treatment transgression. Dependent
variable in Panel B is a dummy indicating whether a person commits another speeding o↵ense within a year of her (second) treatment
transgression. “Below Cuto↵” is the main explanatory variable and is a dummy equal to one if the treatment transgression occurred
within 365 days of the day on which the penalty for the original transgression had obtained legal force. Such a person is very likely
to have her license suspended for 1 month.
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34
31,400

Observations

31,383

Yes

0.9977

(0.023)

16,092

No

0.9836

(0.036)

0.047

0.9996

(0.026)

0.071

⇤⇤⇤

0.9859

(0.019)

0.048⇤⇤

(4)

10,774

No

0.9854

(0.034)

0.053

0.9519

(0.030)

0.069

⇤⇤

0.9417

(0.021)

0.059⇤⇤⇤

(6)

10,769

Yes

0.9879

(0.033)

0.050

0.9479

(0.029)

0.071

⇤⇤

0.9377

(0.021)

0.254
(0.187)

±60 days

0.059⇤⇤⇤

(5)

5,351

No

0.7882

(0.085)

0.037

0.3301

(0.052)

0.055

0.3196

(0.027)

0.053⇤⇤

(8)

5,347

Yes

0.8149

(0.074)

0.029

0.3665

(0.049)

0.052

0.3725

(0.026)

0.247
(0.186)

±30 days

0.052⇤

(7)

0.9865

(0.475)

0.204

0.8733

(0.079)

0.092

0.8379

1,774

0.082

1,774

Yes

0.9998

(0.603)

0.265

0.8612

(0.075)

0.084

0.7889

(0.054)

0.244
(0.183)

(0.060)

No

(10)
±10 days

0.078

(9)

should be added to the regression equation.

The reported p-values correspond to Wald specification tests. Small p-values indicate that a model is not appropriate and higher order polynomials of the running variable

further limit the sample. If indicated, controls for sex, age, the number of prior o↵enses and a set of dummies for the region of residence were included.

columns (3) and (4) only observations with values of the running variable within a 90-day time-window on either side of the 365-day cuto↵ were used. Columns (5) through (10)

365 days of the day on which the penalty for the original transgression had obtained legal force. In columns (1) and (2), the entire discontinuity sample enters the analysis. In

1-month license suspension following the treatment transgression. This dummy was instrumented for using a variable for whether the treatment transgression occurred within

commits another major traffic transgression within 1 year after her treatment transgression. Coefficients are displayed for the main explanatory variable, a dummy indicating a

Each column reports coefficients and standard errors from the second stage of a 2SLS instrumental variable regression. The outcome variable is a dummy equal to one if a person

Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by distinct values of the running variable.

16,086

Yes

1.000

(0.034)

0.049

0.9992

(0.025)

0.073

⇤⇤⇤

0.9785

(0.019)

.254
(0.184)

±90 days

0.050⇤⇤⇤

(3)

Notes: ⇤ ⇤ ⇤/ ⇤ ⇤/⇤ indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.

No

0.9962

(0.024)

0.057

⇤⇤

0.057

0.9895

⇤⇤

(0.020)

0.9934

(0.021)

0.050

⇤⇤

0.052

0.9169

⇤⇤

(0.014)

(0.014)

0.9159

0.048⇤⇤⇤

0.051⇤⇤⇤

0.254
(0.183)

Convariates

p-Value Wald Test:

Cubic

p-Value Wald Test:

Squared

p-Value Wald Test:

Linear

Mean Rate of Recidivism
(SD)

(2)

Full Sample

(1)

Table 4: Treatment E↵ects by Specification and Time Window - Recidivism (Any)
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31,400

Observations

31,383

Yes

0.9756

16,092

No

0.9977

(0.031)

0.019

0.9986

(0.022)

10,774

No

0.9993

(0.029)

0.005

0.9722

(0.026)

0.006

0.9551

(0.018)

0.035⇤⇤

(6)

10,769

Yes

0.9993

(0.030)

0.008

0.9696

(0.026)

0.006

0.9514

(0.018)

0.187
(0.390)

±60 days

0.035⇤

(5)

5,351

No

0.8224

(0.055)

0.037

0.4896

(0.040)

0.012

0.4606

(0.024)

0.011

(8)

5,347

Yes

0.9218

(0.049)

0.044

0.5043

(0.040)

0.012

0.5001

(0.023)

0.186
(0.389)

±30 days

0.011

(7)

0.9578

(0.152)

0.052

0.9652

(0.046)

0.019

0.9505

1,774

0.011

1,774

Yes

0.9544

(0.174)

0.072

0.9750

(0.046)

0.019

0.9473

(0.039)

0.183
(0.387)

(0.041)

No

(10)
±10 days

0.010

(9)

should be added to the regression equation.

The reported p-values correspond to Wald specification tests . Small p-values indicate that a model is not appropriate and higher order polynomials of the running variable

further limit the sample. If indicated, controls for sex, age, the number of prior o↵enses and a set of dummies for the region of residence were included.

columns (3) and (4) only observations with values of the running variable within a 90-day time-window on either side of the 365-day cuto↵ were used. Columns (5) through (10)

365 days of the day on which the penalty for the original transgression had obtained legal force. In columns (1) and (2), the entire discontinuity sample enters the analysis. In

1-month license suspension following the treatment transgression. This dummy was instrumented for using a variable for whether the treatment transgression occurred within

commits another major speeding o↵ense within 1 year after her treatment transgression. Coefficients are displayed for the main explanatory variable, a dummy indicating a

Each column reports coefficients and standard errors from the second stage of a 2SLS instrumental variable regression. The outcome variable is a dummy equal to one if a person

Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by distinct values of the running variable.

16,086

Yes

1.000

(0.031)

0.018

0.9974

(0.022)

0.045

⇤⇤

0.045

0.9646

⇤⇤

(0.017)

0.019

(4)

0.9799

(0.017)

0.185
(0.388)

±90 days

0.019

(3)

Notes: ⇤ ⇤ ⇤/ ⇤ ⇤/⇤ indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.

No

Convariates

0.9758

(0.019)

(0.020)

p-Value Wald-Test:

0.020

0.019

Cubic

0.9851

0.9919

(0.018)

(0.018)

p-Value Wald-Test:

0.022

0.023

Squared

0.8470

(0.012)

(0.012)

0.8774

0.030⇤⇤

0.031⇤⇤⇤

0.184
(0.387)

p-Value Wald-Test:

Linear

Mean Rate of Recidivism
(SD)

(2)

Full Sample

(1)

Table 5: Treatment E↵ects by Specification and Time Window - Speeding Recidivism

Table 6: Naive OLS - E↵ect of License Suspension on Recidivism

Suspension

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.010⇤⇤⇤

0.002⇤⇤

0.003⇤⇤⇤

(0.001)

(0.001)
0.074⇤⇤⇤

Female

(0.001)
0.002⇤⇤⇤

Age

Observations
State Dummies

(0.001)
0.079⇤⇤⇤
(0.001)
0.002⇤⇤⇤

(0.000)

(0.000)

2,170,728

2,170,079

2,170,079

No

No

Yes

Notes: ⇤ ⇤ ⇤/ ⇤ ⇤/⇤ indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
Each column reports coefficients and standard errors from an OLS
regression. Dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if a
person recidivates within 1 year of an initial traffic transgression.
The variable suspension indicates whether a person’s license was
temporarily suspended after the initial traffic transgression.
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Table 7: Non-Parametric Regression Results
(1)

(2)

Recidivism (Any)
1-Month Suspension

0.046⇤⇤

0.046

(3)

(4)

Recidivism (Speeding)
0.023

0.031

(0.029)

(0.019)

(0.032)

(0.023)

Observations Used

13,662

26,714

9,995

16,190

Selection Algorithm

CCT

IK

CCT

IK

Bandwidth

76.44

152.2

55.62

90.61

Notes: ⇤ ⇤ ⇤/ ⇤ ⇤/⇤ indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by distinct values of the running variable.
Each column reports coefficients and standard errors from a local linear regression
discontinuity (RD) model. A triangular Kernel function was used to construct the
estimator. Coefficients yield the e↵ect of a one month license suspension following
the treatment transgression on the probability of committing another violation
within 1 year. Columns (1) and (2) show the results for recidivism in general,
columns (3) and (4) show the result for speeding-specific recidivism.
Bandwidth was selected using algorithms developed by Calonico et al. (2014)
(CCT) and Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011) (IK), respectively.
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Figure 1: Data Selection from the Central Traffic Registry

Notes: This graph illustrates which observations can be used for the analysis. Data source is the digital
German central traffic registry as of 30 April 2014. The final analysis sample is comprised of o↵enders with at
least two speeding transgression. One, the so-called “treatment transgression” must have occurred between
1 May 2012 and 1 December 2012 (dashed frame) thus allowing for a sufficient follow-up period. Another
transgression, the so called “original transgression,” must have occurred prior to the treatment transgression
and the penalty for this original transgression must have obtained legal force between 186 and 545 days
before the date of the treatment transgression. Persons whose transgressions over time are illustrated by
circles are part of the final sample. Persons whose transgressions over time are illustrated by triangles do
not become part of the final sample.
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Figure 2: Treatment Probability by Time

Notes: Everybody in the analysis sample has committed (at least) two speeding violations. The first of
these violations is referred to as the “original transgression.” The second of these violations is referred to as
the “treatment transgression.” Loosely speaking, if the treatment transgression occurs within 365 days after
the original transgression, a person should have his/her license suspended for 1 month. Data are aggregated
by the count of days that have passed between the date on which the penalty for the original transgression
obtained legal force and the date of the treatment transgression. Each point in this plot represents the raw
probability of having one’s license suspended due to the treatment transgression against the day count. The
vertical red line indicates that 366 days have passed between these two transgressions.
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Figure 3: Recidivism Rate by Time
(a) Rate of Recidivism (Any)

(b) Rate of Recidivism (Speeding)

Notes: Everybody in the analysis sample has committed (at least) two speeding violations. The first of these
violations is referred to as the “original transgression.” The second of these violations is referred to as the
“treatment transgression.” Loosely speaking, if the treatment transgression occurs within 365 days after the
original transgression, a person should have his/her license suspended for 1 month. This graph plots rates of
recidivism (i.e. the probability of committing yet another, third o↵ense) within 1 year against the number
of days (in 3-day bins) that have passed between the date on which the penalty for the original transgression
obtained legal force and the date of the treatment transgression. The vertical red line indicates that 366
days have passed between these two dates. The horizontal
40 lowess lines provide a flexible fit.

Figure 4: Distribution of Time until treatment transgression

Notes: Everybody in the analysis sample has committed (at least) two speeding violations. The first of
these violations is referred to as the “original transgression.” The second of these violations is referred to as
the “treatment transgression.” Loosely speaking, if the treatment transgression occurs within 365 days after
the original transgression, a person should have his/her license suspended for 1 month. Each column in this
histogram shows the frequency (in 3-day time intervals) between these two transgressions. For instance, the
first bin indicates that there were 335 incidences in which 186-188 days had passed between the date on which
the penalty for the original transgression obtained legal force and the date of the treatment transgression.
The vertical red line indicates that 366 days have passed between these two dates.
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Figure 5: Non-Outcomes by Time
(a) Average Age

(b) Percentage Female
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(c) Number of Prior O↵enses

Notes: Everybody in the analysis sample has committed (at least) two speeding violations. The first of
these violations is referred to as the “original transgression.” The second of these violations is referred to as
the “treatment transgression.” Loosely speaking, if the treatment transgression occurs within 365 days after
the original transgression, a person should have his/her license suspended for 1 month. This graph plots
averages of non-outcomes against the number of days (in 3-day bins) that have passed between the date on
which the penalty for the original transgression obtained legal force and the date of treatment transgression.
The vertical red line indicates that 366 days have passed between these two dates. The horizontal lowess
lines provide a flexible fit.
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Figure 6: Treatment E↵ect by Bandwith
(a) Rate of Recidivism (Any)

(b) Rate of Recidivism (Speeding)

Notes: This graph displays point estimates and corresponding confidence intervals from a local linear regression discontinuity (RD) model over a range of bandwidth choices. A triangular Kernel function was used to
construct the estimator. The top figure shows the results for recidivism in general. The bottom figure shows
the results for speeding-specific recidivism.
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Figure 7: Treatment E↵ect by Recidivism Time Window
(a) Recidivism (Any)

(b) Recidivism (Any)

Notes: These graphs show point estimates and confidence bands of the treatment e↵ect divided by the
average recidivism rate for di↵erent recidivism time periods. Results stem from a set of linear regressions
with controls for age, sex, number of prior o↵enses, and region of residence.
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